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On January 30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy,
in his State of the Union Message, indicated that the
United States was embarking upon a military program which
in many ways would differ significantly from that of the
preceding administration. In keeping with election
campaign promises to correct America's "prestige, missile,
and limited warfare capability gap," the President
indicated that he had directed prompt action to:
(a) accelerate the entire ballistic missile program;
f
(b) step up the polaris submarine program; and (c) increase
troop and support air lift capability so as to "assure
the ability of our conventional forces to respond with
discrimination and speed, to any problem at any spot on
the globe at any moment's notice."
While acceleration of existing programs did not
necessarily indicate that a major revision of the
country's military strategy was being effected, never-
theless the implied urgency of the acceleration and the
lj. F. Kennedy, "State of the Union Address
January 30, 1961," Department of State Bulletin , Vol.
XLIV, No. 1129 (February 13, 1961), p. 211.

emphasis on conventional airlift were a significant
break with the past, and could certainly be construed
as presaging larger and more all-encompassing changes.
By Spring of 1961, it had become obvious that the
Kennedy administration was committed to something far
more long-reaching than just acceleration of existing
programs. "Quick Fixes" were being implemented to
correct deficiencies in America's strategic military
posture, and these "fixes" and propounded future
objectives in this area began to assume a cohesiveness
and pattern which indicated that a specific and identi-
fiable strategic program had been "chosen" by the
administration and was being systematically implemented.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
explained that the ultimate objective was to develop
military forces that would provide a range of options,
conventional and nuclear, which would put the United
States in the position of "being able to choose, coolly
and deliberately, the level and kind of response we
feel appropriate in our own best interest, and both our
enemies and our friends will know it."^ More specifically,




he pointed out that "we must continue to provide for the
forces required to deter an all-out nuclear war. Only
behind the shield of such forces can the free world
hope to cope successfully with lesser military aggres-
sions. But, having provided these essential forces, we
want to see that this nation . . . has the kinds of
forces needed to discourage more limited military
adventures by the enemies of freedom .... Our limited
war forces should be properly deployed, properly trained,
and properly equipped to deal with the entire spectrum
of such actions; and they should have the means to move
quickly to wherever they may be needed on very short
notice. "
^
The Kennedy Administration had, therefore,
selected a strategy of "flexible response" or "multiple
options." The new approach would place a number of
strategic retaliatory or limited war options in the
hands of the President so that responses to any kind of
attack could be rational and deliberate without the
hazard of either over-reacting to crisis, or not reacting
at all for lack of capability to do otherwise. The key
JW. W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy
, p. 59.

to this strategy and its essential departure from the
Eisenhower strategy was that the Kennedy administration
was "willing" to expend the necessary resources to
provide the requisite capabilities.
Specific priority objectives to this end were,
first, to attain numerical superiority in missiles, and
thus assure the United States a positive second-strike
capability, that is, a force which could survive a
massive surprise nuclear attack and still strike a
decisive counterblow. In March, 1961, President Kennedy
sent a special budget message to the Congress requesting
an additional $650 million for such a purpose. He said,
"Our strategic arms and defenses must be adequate to
deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the United States
or our allies by making clear to any potential aggressors
that sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to
survive a first strike and penetrate his defenses in
order to inflict unacceptable losses upon him."^
,
The second priority objective was the improvement
of America's limited war capability, and in May, 1961,
4J. F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress
on the Defense Budget March 28, 1961," American Foreign
Policy Reader, H. H. Ransom, ed. , p. 199.

President Kennedy again went before the Congress to
request additional funding to this end. Immediate
action was then taken to reorganize the Army's divisional
structure, increase its non-nuclear firepower, improve
its tactical and strategic mobility, and provide it with
the most modern conventional equipment. The Marine Corps
was to be increased to 190,000 men.^
Within the first years of the Kennedy adminis-
tration, the majority of the proposed "quick fixes" had
been implemented. Production rate for the Minuteman ICBM
was doubled, one-half of SAC's bombers were on fifteen-
minute ground alert, SAC's airborne alert was signifi-
cantly increased, the Polaris submarine program was
greatly accelerated—including ten additional boats to
the planned force—and the command and control system for
the strategic nuclear force was improved. ° In the
conventional or limited war area, Army combat divisions
had increased from 11 to 16, with the strategic reserve
in the United States increased from 5 to 10 divisions.
5j. F, Kennedy, "Special Message to Congress 25
May 1961," Department of State Bulletin , Vol. XLIV,





The Navy and Marine amphibious force had increased by
one-third, and long-range airlift had been appreciably
augmented.' In this short period of one year, America's
war-making capability had been improved across the
board, and by 3.96 3 the entire military strategy and
forces of the United States had, with an accompanying
twenty per cent increase in defense spending, been
completely revamped, as well as having a shift in the
very process by which decisions would be made within the
Pentagon. A eulogizer of President Kennedy and
Secretary McNamara, while reviewing these significant
accomplishments, said, "The President himself played a
vital role in sponsoring major adjustments in the style
and substance of the nation's defense effort .... If
Kennedy was the patron of new departures in the realm of
national security, McNamara has been their architect and
engineer." 8 While the dynamic efforts of President
Kennedy and the administrative brilliance of Secretary
McNamara are not disputed, there would, nevertheless, be






conceptualization and implementation of a strategic
program of such magnitude as "Flexible Response" was due
wholly to the perceptiveness , brilliance, and competence
of these individuals. Such a view would tend to ignore a
number of political and practical facts of life. First,
that executive perceptiveness, brilliance, and competence
are not always marketable commodities within the context
of America's legislative process. Second, and most
important, the successful implementation of a major and
appreciably different strategic program, with all that im-
plies in terms of philosophies, loyalties, money, and
material, would presuppose a mood or climate, on the part
of a majority in both Houses of Congress, favorable toward
more defense spending and for a more balanced and
flexible defense posture. A favorable climate or mood
obviously implies that such changes in strategic concepts
and associated force and material levels of readiness
were not new or novel issues before the Congress, but
rather issues that had been considered before, and at
this point in time now met with sufficient approval to
carry them into law. A more realistic possibility, then,
is that the Kennedy Administration implemented or pulled
together, in a most impressive fashion, a strategic
concept and associated military programs that in many

respects had been evolving within the Congress over a
period of years.
Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee , once said, "God help the
American people, if Congress starts legislating strategy." 9
That statement, plus a cursory perusal of the organiza-
tional breakdown of the Senate and House Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees, which would reveal nothing
on strategic deferrence or limited war, might lead to a
conclusion that the Congress is neither motivated nor
organized to exert influence or play a part in the
formulation of strategic military policy. This, combined
with a record of general unwillingness on the part of the
Congress to exercise a veto over strategic programs
proposed by the Executive would seem to lend even more
credence to such a conclusion, and would tend to buttress
a commonly expressed view that Congress has contributed
little of benefit to defense policy since 1945.
Yet such a conclusion, with its accompanying
harsh judgment as to the Congressional contribution, is
not borne out by legislative history subsequent to the




Korean War. Congress does exert and has exerted consid-
erable influence on the formulation of strategic policy
and programs. This influence is primarily felt through
its review and rearrangement of the myriad budgetary
figures that the executive branch annually presents for
confirmation. In the course of this process of developing
appropriations legislation, the Congress, or, more
accurately, certain individuals or groups within the
Congress, do attempt to exert pressure on behalf of
specific military programs and/or policies. These
individuals or groups thus assume a lobbying role with
relation to the Executive, and they can, depending upon
their influence and through public criticism and encourage-
ment of Executive dissidents, force the Administration to
pay a significant price for the strategic military policy
it desires. This lobbying pressure, which can consist of
individual representations, public hearings on appropria-
tions, and/or manpower authorizations, or public investi-
gations on critical strategic programs or situations, does
enable the Congress to bring considerable pressure to bear
upon the Administration and forces the administration to
make public defense of its military policies.
What follows is an effort to assess the role of

10
Congress, both in its capacity to legitimize public
policy and as a lobbying institution, incident to the
creation and ultimate implementation of the strategic
military programs of Flexible Response.

CHAPTER I
EARLY CONCERN 195 3-1956
In January, 1954, the United States presented
an ironic strategic paradox to the world. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, in an address before the
Council on Foreign Relations, boldly stated that henceforth
the United States would adhere to a doctrine of massive
nuclear retaliation as a total solution to all military
conflicts that might arise between the United States
and the Communist bloc. The dilemma presented by this
stance was, of course, that in a period when the nuclear
advantage of the United States was clearly fading, the
defense policy was placing ever-increasing emphasis and
dependence upon nuclear weapons. Secretary Dulles
expressed abhorrence at the possibility of the United
States' having to conventionally meet all the possible
local challenges that could be generated by the Communists.
He said, "If an enemy could pick his time and place and
method of warfare—and if our policy was to remain the
traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local
opposition—then we need to be ready to fight in the
Arctic and in the Tropics, in Asia, the Near East, and
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in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons
and with new weapons .... This could not be continued
for long without grave budgeting, economic, and social
consequences . "10 He concluded that the choice of massive
retaliation as a strategy "permits of a selection of
military means instead of a multiplication of means. As
a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic
security at less cost."-'-! The basic criteria for the
selection of massive retaliation as a national military
strategy was most aptly summed up by "more basic security
at less cost." This theme would predominate and charac-
terize the Eisenhower Administration's approach to military
strategy and preparedness over the next seven years. It
is not implied that economy in defense spending is
inherently evil or wrong, and every administration attempts
to acquire more security for less money, yet the balance
between security and cost is a delicate one, and emphasis
on one at the expense of the other can be disastrous. The
Eisenhower Administration, at this point in time, contended,
10J. F. Dulles, "Address Before the Council on
Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954," Department of State




however, that the balance to be struck by its "New Look"
was one that America was badly in need of, particularly
in view of the economic difficulties that were
anticipated on termination of hostilities in Korea.
The "New Look" was an effort on the part of the
Administration to reconcile military requirements and
economic goals. It was founded, first, on the belief
that the threat to America ' s security was both economic
and military and that a proper balance between the two
was necessary to meet the threat; second, on the belief
that the dual threat was a continuing one, and, therefore,
that once a proper balance was achieved it should be
maintained indefinitely. However, the adoption of
massive retaliation, with all of its economic overtones,
as the principal military strategy, plus other economic
measures that had been initiated with respect to the
military establishment in 1953, seemed to indicate to
some Congressional and military observers that the
emphasis of the Eisenhower Administration might be too
heavy toward the economic side of the scale. Congressional
and military concern over such matters was publicly
-^Huntington, op. cit
. , p. 76.
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expressed as early as March, 1953. At this time, the
United States was still sustaining relatively heavy
casualties in Korea while negotiations were in progress,
and yet, in spite of this, the Administration announced
that the Army in 1954 would be reduced from 1,480,000 to
1,330,000 men, along with other reductions in funding
13for the Air Force and Navy. During hearings before
the House Appropriations Subcommittee, considering the
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for February,
1954, Democratic committee members, who were in a
minority at this time, and several witnesses, were most
vocal in their opposition to the proposed cuts. On
March 11, 1953, General Van Fleet, who had just recently
commanded the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, testified that
he was "disgusted with the luxury of America and the
paucity of preparedness." He went on to say that "we
must face up to the issue that our problems are those of
world Communism, and that we are going to be faced with
these problems for a long time to come. It is time we
put our house in order .... I would provide more bullets






built. We ought to have a stockpile of ammunition
rather than a stockpile of gold."-'- 4 General Van Fleet's
views were well known beforehand, and his testimony, if
somewhat emotional, was at least predictable.
A good counterpoint to General Van Fleet's
testimony was the statement by Representative Carl Vinson
of Georgia, before the same Subcommittee. Congressman
Vinson, a Democrat and Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, spoke calmly and convincingly against
the cutting of the defense budget from $46.9 billion in
1953 to $41.3 billion in 1954. He said, "You have
certain fixed changes [and] some things you just can't
cut. If you maintain this military strength and feed and
equip it properly, you have to accept certain minimum
expenditures .... If you are going to have an adequate
defense, you're going to have big expenditures that aren't
flexible. "I-* The testimony of General Van Fleet and the
statement by Representative Vinson, although differing
widely. in style, serve well as examples or samplings of the
l^U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense






dissatisfaction that prevailed within certain quarters
of the military, and the growing uneasiness within the
Congress over the proposed economies of the "New Look."
Later in the year, Secretary of the Army Stevens came under
"heavy fire" before the same Subcommittee concerning the
future combat effectiveness of the Army in its reduced
state, but there was nothing quite as spectacular as
General Van Fleet's testimony in March.
In terms of practical results in 1953, the concern
expressed before and within the Congress did not signifi-
cantly change the Administration's proposed reductions.
The Army appropriation lost almost $7 00 million in its
passage through the House and Senate, while the Navy and
the Air Force suffered reductions of approximately $350
1 f,
million and $130 million respectively. u The most
significant efforts on the part of the Congress to oppose
these reductions consisted of a Democratic sponsored
amendment in the House to increase Air Force appropriations
by $1,175 billion, and a Senate motion to expand aircraft
procurement by $400 million. Both proposals were defeated
by a comfortable margin due to a relatively stable '






In considering the Congressional appraisal of
the 1954 defense budget, it would appear that too much
of its attention was concentrated on strategic air power
and that other equally significant facets of the
Administration's proposals were uncritically accepted.
Despite the fact that fighting was still heavy in Korea,
and despite the likelihood of other limited wars being
waged against the United States, Congress gave little
pause to examine the defense budget in terms of its
ability to provide the necessary military capabilities
to cope with these varied challenges. The Congress, as
was customary, had not exercised any veto over the
Administration's strategic programs, but opposition to
the economies of the "New Look" was now developing,
primarily along party lines, and was gaining in strength,
In February, 1954, this increasing opposition
again manifested itself during hearings before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, considering the Department
of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1955. The main issue





Subcommittee was the projected force reductions in the
Army proposed for 1955. The goal for June, 1955, was
set at 1,100,000 men, which was a decline of 73,000 men
from the goal set for that time a year earlier. ° The
reduction itself was sufficient to create a stir, but
the acceleration of the reduction provided even more
incentive for certain Democratic members of the Sub-
committee to attack the programs of the "New Look."
Secretary of Defense Wilson, in his prepared opening
statement, summed up the Administration's position with
respect to these reductions in saying, "As we increase
the striking power of our combat forces by the application
of technological advances and new weapons, and by the
continuing growth of air power, the total number of
military personnel can be reduced. " He then added,
"While this budget places proper emphasis on air power,
there is still the need, and there will continue to be a
need, for increasingly effective land, amphibious, anti-
submarine and other forces." 19 The statement, while
II Huntington, op . c i
t
. , p. 79.
l^U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1955 , 8 3rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 1954, p. 8.
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attempting to justify conventional force reductions, at
the same time emphasizes a continuing need for them.
Wilson's remarks on conventional force requirements were
certainly incompatible with the concept of massive
retaliation as propounded by the Secretary of State the
previous year and at the same time inconsistent with the
action being taken by the Administration in across-the-
board reductions in these forces. This apparent
inconsistency was not lost on the committee , and immedi-
ate efforts were made to determine exactly what Secretary
Wilson meant. Representative Mahon asked Wilson if, "in
view of the increased emphasis on atomic retaliation . . ,
is there any basis for the charge that the budget tends
to encourage the beginning of small fires short of a
fire that would be sufficiently provocative to launch an
all-out war? u Secretary Wilson's answer, in short, was
that emphasis on atomic retaliation was not really
America's policy, and that the budget, as such, would not
encourage small wars which could escalate into general
war. This exchange represented one of the first public
acknowledgments that the Administration was modifying its
20 Ibid., p. 92
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stand on massive retaliation, even though the standing
conventional forces in NATO and the Far East had long
been a tacit acknowledgment of the same thing.
The remainder of this particular hearing consisted
primarily of skillful questioning on the part of
Representative Sikes of Florida in drawing out the
dissatisfaction of Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew
Ridgway, over the projected Force reductions, and in
baiting Army Secretary Stevens on the Army's so-called
"mobile readiness." Representative Sikes, a Democrat
and a Reserve Army General, was one of the foremost
critics of the Administration's defense policies and a
leading proponent of a more flexible national strategy
based upon balanced military forces. Although Repre-
sentative Sikes was hampered by his minority position on
the Subcommittee, he was able to get General Ridgway,
whose later writings on U.S. military posture would cause
a significant stir, to acknowledge that the combat
readiness of the Army was being adversely affected by the
force reductions, and that the Administration was taking
a gamble in effecting these reductions before sufficient
tactical nuclear weapons were available to "replace"
conventional manpower. Sikes was also able to make the
point that the mobile readiness of the Strategic Army was

21
not a reality. The airlift capability for such an
endeavor was simply not being developed.
In the course of this hearing, minority members
of the Subcommittee also reacted unfavorably to proposed
reductions in the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the
principal target for the proposed cuts was, and would
continue to be, the Army.
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in consider-
ing the Department of Defense appropriations for 1955,
concurred with the Administration and House recommendation
to reduce the Army appropriation, but recommended
increases for the Navy and Air Force. The Committee also
noted, probably for the first time publicly, that some-
thing might be remiss in the nation's guided missile
program. The Senate report said, in part, "Testimony
both on and off the record focused the Committee's
attention on what appears to be a disorganized situation
relating to the guided missile program." 22 This brief
21 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of the
Army Appropriations for 1955 , 83rd Congress, 2nd Session,
1954, pp. 54-56.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Report, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
1955
,




observation was an initial indicator of a legislative
concern that would later develop into something approach-
ing a national crisis.
The end result of the legislative action in 1954,
with respect to strategic military programs, was sub-
stantially the same as 1953. The Administration proceeded
to effect the projected reductions as planned, and again
the Congress did not appreciably influence or interfere
with the strategic programs. Generally, the hearings on
the February 1955 defense budget were disappointing.
Most of the majority members of Congress received the "New
Look" sympathetically and few did so thoughtfully.
Assertions by the Administration that the "New Look" was
a radical departure from past defense policies was
generally accepted at face value with only a limited number
of legislators publicly expressing doubts as to whether
this really was the case. No deep probes were conducted
by the Appropriations or Armed Services Committees into
the assumptions on which the New Look rested, but rather
they defined their review function narrowly, devoting most
of their energies to securing the same amount of military
capacity advocated by the President, but at a lower cost.
The legislative protestations had become somewhat

23
louder and more vociferous, but nothing had really
changed. Thus, in January, 1955, President Eisenhower
could proudly declare that a $7.4 billion tax reduction
was due entirely to large cuts within the government.
What was not readily apparent from this statement was
that the majority of these cuts had come out of national
security. 23
The year 1955 promised to be a more difficult
period for the Administration's "New Look" policies. The
Democratic victory in 1954 swelled the number of opponents
to the Eisenhower military program and brought some of
them to posts on the House and Senate Appropriations and
Armed Services Subcommittees. The 1954 setback of the
French in Indo-China also increased Congressional concern
over the adequacy of the New Look. Indo-China had
exposed a glaring weakness in America's military capacity.
There simply were not sufficient ground forces to inter-
vene effectively.
In military posture briefings before the House
Armed Services Committee in January, 1955, it was readily
apparent from the exchanges that ensued that the legis-
23Huntington, op. cit
. , p. 76.
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lators were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
long, rambling, evasive, and sometimes contradictory
answers provided by Secretary of Defense Wilson in
response to questions concerning strategic military
planning, particularly those effecting force level
reductions. In his opening statement, Secretary Wilson
reiterated the strategy of primary reliance on strategic
nuclear forces, and again gave minimal deference to
forces required to oppose local aggression. ^4 Massive
retaliation, as conceived by John Foster Dulles, was
apparently being permanently laid to rest, yet the
Administration's commitment to the development and main-
tenance of conventional forces to accommodate lesser
aggressions could hardly be construed as substantial.
The Committee members immediately broached the
issue of reduction in conventional forces and the effect
that such reductions would have on America's general and
limited war capability. Representative Vinson inserted a
letter into the record which he had previously sent to
24u.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings, Sundry Legislation Affecting the
Naval and Military Establishment (Briefings on National
Defense), 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1955, p. 204.
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Secretary Wilson. The letter, which expressed his concern
over continuing force reductions, said in part, "The
Department of Defense convinced Congress last year that
it was essential to the defense of this country to main-
tain an end strength of 3,032,000 men on June 30, 1955.
Upon what basis does the Department now find that it was
in error in recommending the end strength? My candid
observation at this point ... is that it might be wise
. . . to put on the brakes for the reduction plan for
this final year. "25 From the testimony that followed,
it appeared that a consensus of the Committee agreed with
Vinson's view. In the course of this hearing, Secretary
of the Navy Thomas acknowledged that any future cuts in
the Navy would jeopardize the proper defense of the
country, ^ o and General Ridgway emphatically stated that,
in his opinion, the proposed 140,000-man cut in the Army
would further jeopardize national security. 27 <phe
Committee members also expressed indignation over the fact
that the Department of Defense had proceeded to reduce










appropriated funds in the previous year, and that this
had been done without consultation or notice to the
Congress. 28 n^Q propriety of this action is not a
matter for consideration here. What is germane is that
the sensibilities of the Congress had been offended,
and the rather offhand manner in which the action was
explained only added to the aggrievement . The bad feeling
generated in this dispute over carefully guarded pre-
rogatives and separation of powers would cause the
Administration considerable difficulty in the months to
come.
This particular issue was one of the first taken
up by the House Appropriations Subcommittee in the
January, 1955, hearings considering the Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1956. Representative Sikes
immediately confronted Secretary of Defense Wilson with
the problem. Wilson's reply to Sikes' inquiry as to why
the Congress was not consulted prior to reduction of the
Army below authorized strength verged on the contemptuous.
He said, "Well, I never thought much about that, to tell
you the truth. "29
28 Ibid.
, pp. 311-312.
29 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
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Wilson, as well as being generally offensive in
the course of the hearing, was also unconvincing on
several critical issues. When asked if the reduction in
conventional forces would not invite other situations like
Korea, he replied dogmatically, "I can answer that one
cold by saying that there is no such situation.
"
3 ^
Wilson was equally unpersuasive when confronted with the
fact that the latest reductions within the Army were
done without consultation with the Army Chief of Staff
as to the effects of such reductions, and further that
such reductions did not have the support of a majority of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In reply, Wilson said, "I
do not think it is unusual. I think it happened many
times before." 3 For a man presenting increasingly
unpopular programs to a now Democratic-controlled and
therefore increasingly hostile Congress, the casual
indifference verging on contempt displayed by Wilson in
his exchanges with the Committee members could only result
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1956 , 84th Congress, 1st
Session, 1955, p. 28.
30 Ibid.
, p. 35.
31 Ibid., p. 27.
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in compounding the Administration's problem of implemen-
ting the policies of the "New Look."
Increasing Congressional resistance to the "New
Look" was more apparent in the Senate at this time. There
the Appropriations Committee recommended that the Army
appropriation be increased over the House recommendation
by $235,000, the Air Force increased by a "whopping"
$337,859,170, and the Navy and Marine Corps reduced by
$48, 834.
3
2 Senator Stuart Symington, however, led the
Democratic majority in a fight to amend the Appropriations
Committee's report upward, particularly the Navy and
Marine Corps figure. He proposed a $46 million increase
in Marine Corps personnel funds to raise the force from
190,000 to 215,000 men during Fiscal Year 1956. In a close
forty-to-thirty-nine vote, Symington's amendment
carried. This limited victory was quickly undone,
however, when the Administration impounded most of the
extra funds which were provided.
Congress ultimately approved reductions in both
32u.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropri-
ations, Report, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
1956







the Army and the Navy (exclusive of the Marine Corps
personnel increase) appropriations, and an increase for
the Air Force. The Air Force increase was actually in
keeping with the Administration's emphasis on strategic
air power, and therefore cannot be construed as being
in opposition to the "New Look." The Marine Corps
increase actually represented the sole significant
Congressional redirection of the Administration's defense
policies. It was the most propitious sign of the rising
doubts about the "New Look" programs, and of Congress'
growing interest in deciding for itself what was the
actual defense capability of the nation.
The second "New Look" budget of 1956 had, there-
fore, experienced far more serious resistance in passing
through Congress. Receptivity to the Administration's
military policies had worn considerably thinner in the
course of one year. There had developed a sharper sense of
scepticism among the House and Senate Appropriations and
Armed Services Committees as to the political and military
considerations underpinning the "New Look." It was obvious
that legislative pressure on the Executive to provide more
viable answers to the question of how the United States
could retain a powerful military posture in the face of
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continuing force and service appropriation reductions was
increasing significantly.
The House Appropriations Subcommittee's examina-
tion of the Fiscal Year 1957 defense budget was particularly
searching when compared with preceding years. It was
apparent that some Committee members were attempting to
conceptualize in defense program terms or policies rather
than solely in categories of financial management or
spending ceilings. The Senate Appropriations Committee
also took a much closer look at the budget in terms of
policy ramifications, and recommended significant
increases for both the Army and the Navy over the Fiscal
Year 1956 appropriation, and another huge increase of
over two billion dollars for the Air Force. 34
However, the Symington hearings on air power
overshadowed the appropriations review in public import-
ance, and had a detectable influence on the Senate's
recommendation to increase the Air Force appropriation.
In large part, as a result of these hearings, the short-
comings of the nation's air power capability became one
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Report, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
1957, Report No. 2260, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956.
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of the major issues of the 1956 Presidential campaign.
In spite of the increasing criticism of its
military programs, from both the military establishment
and the Congress, the Administration still publicly
contended that, regardless of reductions in service
funding and manpower, the United States was militarily
stronger than ever before. Secretary of State Dulles in
May, 1956, told the world that "The United States . . .
has itself made a considerable aggregate reduction in the
number of men under arms [and] we have felt that we were
stronger as a result of our shifts. They did not involve
any diminution in our military power . . . ."35 However,
this view received a most substantial "lambasting" with
the publication of General Matthew B. Ridgway's memoirs
in 195 6. General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff from 1953
to 1956, had retired on 30 June 1955, and his memoirs
entitled Soldier had considerable impact on the Congress.
The General, during his tenure as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, had continually opposed the force and
fund reductions to the Army, and by the time of his
35J. F. Dulles, "News Conference on 22 May 1956,"





retirement he was held in considerable disfavor by the
Administration. In his memoirs he first pointed out
that further planned reductions in the Army would
incapacitate it as an effective fighting force. He said
that "to slash the forces in uniform from 1,500,000 to
1,000,000 by the summer of 1956 . . . would so weaken the
Army that it could no longer carry out its missions. "36
Second, he expressed the view that not only the Army was
becoming impotent, but the entire present United States
military forces were inadequate in strength, and improperly
proportioned to meet these commitments. General Ridgway's
most telling point, however, was his judgment that under
the present administration national security was being
determined by a politically "established" budget instead
of military requirements recommended by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. In this regard he said, "The 1955 budget was
a directed verdict as were the Army budgets for 1956 and
1957. The force levels provided in all these were not
primarily based on military needs. They were not based
on the freely reached conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. They were squeezed between the framework of
3°M. B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew
B. Ridgway, p. 288.
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arbitrary manpower and fiscal limits. "27 He summed up
by stating that the military budget itself was "not
based so much on military requirements, as on what the
economy of the country could stand, as on political
considerations . " 38
General Ridgway's observations on the budget
vis-a-vis national security were a most astute evaluation
of the more significant factors affecting America's
military strategy in the mid- and late 1950 's. The fact
that budgetary considerations could prevail over
realistic military requirements, with the obvious atten-
dant risk involved, revealed a most serious, if not the
most serious, flaw in the Eisenhower Administration's
approach to strategic military planning.
General Ridgway also proposed a strategy and
force structure that he felt were essential for the
security of the United States. He said, "We must possess
the power of swift and devastating retaliation. At the
same time we must possess the capability for selective
retaliation [to enable the United States] to apply
37 ibid






whatever degree of force a particular situation
demanded." 39 The force required to implement this
strategy "must be a properly proportioned force of all
arms, so deployed in danger spots around the world so
that each different component— land, sea, and air—can
bring its own special forms of fire power most effectively
to bear, as a member of a combined force of all arms. It
must be adequately trained, properly armed, highly
mobile, and strong in the active elements which can strike
back without delay in answer to any armed attack. 4
These recommendations were, for all intents and purposes,
the foundation for the strategic concept of Flexible
Response, and General Ridgway's successor, General Maxwell
Taylor, would enlarge upon them and in concert with a
growing consensus in the Congress strive to implement
them.
Reaction to Soldier was varied and heated. These
were most serious allegations, and if true, or even
partially true, the Administration stood accused of
hazarding national security for impressive budget







views would claim that Ridgway was a narrow, dissatisfied
soldier who was bitter over the lessening role of the
Army. Those who agreed would and did claim that the
General merely substantiated what had been suspected all
along.
Regardless of initial reaction, Soldier came at
a time when a large and growing group within the Congress
were beginning to have serious misgivings about America's
military posture, and Ridgway ' s work could not help but
confirm such misgivings and add impetus to the efforts
to do something about it.
Up to this point, however, Congress, by and large,
had only sparingly used its power over military appropri-
ations to legislate defense policy directly. Only in
striving to stabilize the Marine Corps, and in substan-
tially increasing the Air Force appropriation, had it
specifically attempted to compel the administration to
spend funds over and above what had been proposed, and
these efforts were not wholly successful. In terms of
influencing the Administration's strategic military
policies, they were relatively insignificant. The
Congress, as was traditional, had generally refused to
veto the Executive's military proposals, and by June, 1956,
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the "New Look" was achieving, and even ahead of, its
original goals. The Army manpower reductions were
carried out almost as scheduled, and by the Fall of 1956
it was down to one million men.^ The Eighty-fourth
Congress, while more critical of the "New Look," did not
succeed in departing significantly from it.
The Congress was, however, obviously becoming
more agitated over these matters and the Administration
could certainly anticipate far stronger resistance to its
strategic military policies than it had in the past.
41Huntington, op. cit




The anticipated Congressional pressure on the
Administration to justify its strategic policies and
programs materialized almost immediately in 1957 despite
somewhat dampened enthusiasm among the Democratic critics
resulting from the re-election of President Eisenhower
during the previous year. The Congress, however, still
remained under Democratic control, and the annual
military posture briefings before the House Armed Services
Committee, in January, 1957, presented the first oppor-
tunity to take the "New Look" to task.
Although there were many facets of the Adminis-
tration's national security policy which the Committee
members did not find to their liking, that which disturbed
them most was the Administration's reduction of forces
below the level for which the Congress had appropriated
funds, plus not expending other appropriated funds for
equipment procurement as had been directed by the
Congress. This issue had arisen before, but the Adminis-
tration now appeared to be following these procedures at
more frequent intervals, and this, combined with increasing
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scepticism as to the adequacy of America's military
capability, tended to make it a matter of greater
significance and concern. Exchanges between Committee
members and Secretary of Defense Wilson clearly estab-
lished the Administration's position in this regard.
Wilson was most emphatic when he told the Committee that
he would adhere to the President's decision and orders
regardless of conflicting directives emanating from the
Congress. ^ This certainly is not an unusual position
for a Cabinet officer to take, yet from the clamor that
ensued it was obvious that the members of the Committee
took this as a direct challenge to their constitutional
prerogatives. If nothing else, this at least foretold
of increased efforts on the part of the Congress to
preclude the Executive from ignoring legislative
directives as to the spending of appropriated funds in
the future.
In the course of these same briefings, General
Maxwell Taylor, the new Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged
under heavy questioning that recent Army structural
42u.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings, Sundry Legislation Affecting the
Naval and Military Establishment (Military Posture
Brief incT^ S3 th Congre s s , zrTd
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organizations were due entirely to budgetary cuts and not
to military requirements. Concern was also expressed
over the deteriorating condition of the Navy, and several
Committee members were of the opinion that additional
funds should be appropriated immediately for its improve-
ment .
In general, the Congressional views expressed
in these briefings were indicative of the growing legis-
lative cynicism toward the bland reassurances put forth
by the Administration with regard to America's military
capability. It was apparent that Congress would, in the
future, be assessing Executive justification of national
security policies far more carefully and critically than
it had in the past.
One Administration justification for continued
force reductions which came under close scrutiny by the
Congress in 1957 was that of tactical nuclear weapons.
What with the vast increase in fire power afforded by
these weapons, it was contended that fewer conventional
ground forces would be required. Secretary Wilson told
the Congress in early 1957 that American defense policy
"is based on the use of atomic weapons in a major war and
is based on the use of such atomic weapons as would be
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militarily feasible and usable in a smaller war ....
In other words, the smaller atomic weapons, the tactical
weapons, in a sense have now become the conventional
weapons." 4 -^ What Secretary Wilson did not say was that,
relative to the support of large conventional forces,
these weapons were cheap. This fact was not lost, how-
ever, upon the members of the House Subcommittee on
Appropriations during hearings on the Department of Defense
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1958. Representative Sikes,
a long-time Army benefactor and foremost House critic of
the Administration's nuclear strategies, asked Admiral
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a long-time
Army detractor and foremost military spokesman for the
Administration's nuclear strategies, if it were not true
that "We feel we cannot afford to take to the country a
budget large enough to permit the retention of conven-
tional preparedness plus atomic preparedness . . . ."44
Admiral Radford replied that this was impossible, and,
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imply to the enemy that we would not fight a nuclear war.
Sikes countered with a reply which reflected an astute
appreciation of strategic military realities. He said,
"I think if you tell the enemy what you are not going to
do and what you are not going to be prepared to do that
you are, by such action, automatically inviting him to




In the course of this same hearing, Sikes also
broached the subject of America's inadequate military
airlift capability. This particular problem had been
comprehensively covered during the hearings on air power
conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1956,
and numerous significant weaknesses had been revealed.
In the face of this well-substantiated evidence, it was
somewhat startling when Admiral Radford, in response to
Sikes' query, said that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
4 f<
were well satisfied with this capability. Radford's
inability to recognize, or at least to acknowledge, well-







sional scepticism with respect to the Administration's
strategic military policies.
However, in spite of the decreasing credibility
as to the efficacy of these policies, the Senate
Appropriations Committee in June, 1957, nevertheless made
recommendations that, with the exception of the Navy,
were entirely compatible with the desires of the Exec-
utive. The Army's appropriation was to be reduced by
approximately $175 million under Fiscal Year 1957, the
Air Force reduced approximately $93 million, and the Navy
increased approximately $64 million. ^' The recommended
reduction in Air Force funding was particularly surprising
in view of the substantial increases recommended in the
two preceding years, plus the findings of the Senate Air
Power hearings in 1956. The rationale for this decision
and the general dampening of anti-Administration spirit
that had prevailed in this Committee the previous year was
not satisfactorily borne out in the hearings or report.
One explanation that has been given is that, in view of
^
'U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Report, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill




President Eisenhower's re-election in 1956, Congressional
critics thought it politically unwise at this time to
aggressively pursue efforts to modify programs which
apparently met with substantial public approval.
In any event, the Administration was in no way
precluded from executing its stated objectives, and
throughout the summer and early fall of 1957 the projected
force level reductions and other "economies" were carried
out. The Army lost two divisions, the Air Force was cut
back to 117 wings, and the Navy, in spite of the Senate
Appropriations Committee recommendation, lost 2 9 combatant
ships and 59 other vessles.
In this same period, the Executive was presented
with the final report of the Gaither Committee. This ad
hoc committee was established by President Eisenhower to
conduct a careful evaluation of America's national
security posture. Although the report was not made
public, its findings came to be known. In substance, it
said that if the United States did not immediately change
its present strategic and military policies it was in
danger of becoming a second-class power. The report made
4 Q
°Huntington, op . c l t
. , p. 95.
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three major recommendations: first, reduce the vulnera-
bility of the Strategic Air Command and insure second-
strike capabilities sufficient to pose unacceptable losses
to the USSR; second, develop conventional war capabilities;
and, third, reorganize the Pentagon and particularly
strengthen the unified and specified commands. y
While still digesting the harsh judgments and
recommendations of a hand-picked partisan committee, the
Administration and the world were confronted with the
Soviet launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, followed
by Sputnik II less than a month later.
Sputnik stirred the whole of Congress and its
many separate and loosely related policy processes into
action. In the wake of the October launching, four
distinct investigations were inaugurated to ascertain
American progress in satellite and missile development.
The most significant of these was the investigation of
the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. This was the beginning of a long
series of hearings over the next two years inquiring into





moment, however, the Subcommittee, acknowledging that
the United States was behind the Soviet Union in missile
and satellite technology, wanted to know why. The
answer that came out of this investigation was that
budget considerations had prevailed over research and
development requirements. General Maxwell Taylor, when
queries on the Army's role in the nation's missile
program, which at this time was substantial, not only
pinpointed the inadequate funding provided for missile
research, but also showed that the Army, in an effort to
compensate for the shortage of funds and yet still
develop a missile program, was adversely affecting other
essential Army capabilities. He said, "We have found
our missile programs have lived up to their technological
expectations, but unfortunately they have come high in
dollar costs. So within the comparatively limited
budgets we have had to work with, to a large extent we
have had to pay for the missile program out of what you
might call conventional equipment . "50 General Taylor's
remarks generally reflected the consensus service position
50 U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Mi ssile Programs
,
85th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1957, p. 477.
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on conduct of the missile program. An ironic observation
that could be made at this point is that an Administration
which placed almost complete emphasis on a strategy of
supremacy of airborne nuclear retaliatory forces, at the
expense of conventional forces, was now finding itself
deficient in both.
Recognizing this, the Congress, particularly the
Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, began to
adopt a more acutely conscious interest in policy
questions. It would become obvious in the hearings
following Sputnik that these committees were placing more
emphasis on consideration of policy decisions which create
the forces which require support, rather than just
concentrating on the details of support itself. This
Congressional policy orientation was given further impetus
by what appeared to be a lethargic response on the part
of the Executive to the Sputnik launchings.
It was anticipated that the Administration would
act immediately to accelerate missile programs and
implement the recommendations of the Gaither Report, yet,
in spite of these events, the Administration only
reluctantly agreed to increases in the long-range missile
programs.




grudgingly requested by the Executive, for purposes of
expediting these programs, were conducted before the
House Appropriations Subcommittee in early January, 1958.
The amount of funding requested by the Administration was
not, in the opinion of the Democratic majority, propor-
tional to the urgency of requirements for an accelerated
ballistic missile program. This, and the fact that 1958
was a Congressional election year, combined to make this
hearing a most trying experience for Administration
witnesses. A general increase in public interest in defense
matters subsequent to Sputnik also meant that Democratic
Committee members were "playing to a larger audience" than
they ever had before. They therefore took every oppor-
tunity to not only demonstrate the culpability of the
Administration with respect to the United States 1 lagging
the Soviet Union in missile and space technology, but also to
show that, in view of the paucity of funds requested, no
real effort was being made to correct this condition. This
last point was not difficult in the making, for testimony
by Administration witnesses throughout the hearing seemed
to give credence to the assertion that the Executive was
not as disturbed about this situation as was the public
or Congress, and was taking a less than dynamic approach
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toward its resolution. This was certainly confirmed when
Secretary of the Air Force Douglas, who, when asked what
could be done to accelerate the nation's space program,
replied that "the extent to which we are behind in
ballistic missiles at the moment is something that cannot
immediately be cured by dollars. "51 Representative Sikes,
therefore, did the Administration no injustice when, in
addressing the Secretary of Defense, he said, "Mr.
Secretary, we have appropriated to the Department of
Defense for a number of years substantially all of the
money which has been requested for the defense of the
Nation. This is particularly true in the field of research
and development. Despite the fact that we have relied on
the information given us by the Department of Defense and
have voted substantially all of the money required,
particularly in these critical fields, we now find that
we are lagging in certain very important areas, perhaps
dangerously so ... . Seemingly we knew nothing until
the launching of the satellites about this phenomenal
Russian progress. If anyone in our Government knew some-
51u.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental
Defense Appropriati ons for 195~8*^ 85th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1958, p. 119.
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thing about it, no action was taken on the knowledge.
The Congress was not requested to do anything about it. "52
While Sikes' rebuke was admittedly a declaration of
Congressional innocence in these matters, particularly in
view of the Democratic majority since 1955, it neverthe-
less was substantially true. The Congress had in the past,
with but few exceptions, provided funds to the Executive
for national security on a basis that had preserved
Presidential initiative and discretion. From this point
on, however, Congressional criticism of the Administration's
strategic programs greatly intensifies and begins to
solidify into a consensus view. Whereas in the past,
legislative intervention, and even initiative, in defense
policy had been episodic and desultory, it now would
become a persistent characteristic of the Eighty-fifth and
Eighty-sixth Congresses.
Increasing Congressional interest and concern over
defense policy decisions as such, vice the myriad minutiae
resulting from such decisions, was reflected in the January
and February 1958 hearings before the House Appropriations





Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1959. The Committee
had before it a recently published study on national
defense entitled, International Security: The Military
Aspect . This private study, which had been initiated by
Nelson Rockefeller and financed by the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, was extremely critical of the Administra-
tion's strategic military policies, and generally sub-
stantiated those views being expressed by a growing
consensus within the Congress. Democratic Committee
members, therefore, enthusiastically entered sections of
the study into the record. The report said, in part, that
"Programs of great importance to the United States now
suffer from insufficient funds .... The result has been
a serious imbalance in our military preparedness. Recent
budgetary ceilings could be maintained only by a reduction
in forces in all services, a process which has been slowly
going on for the past three years. The budgetary squeeze
affected not only force levels, it also slowed down our
research effort in many fields, causing us to lose ground
to the USSR." 53 The report's recommendations for correction
-"^u.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 195 9 , 3 5th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1958, p. 53.
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of these conditions ranged from modernizing Army equip-
ment and increasing troop airlift and sealift, to changing
methods of budgeting within the Department of Defense.
The report also commented upon problems with respect to
strategic planning within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It said, "The roles and missions assigned to the indi-
vidual military services have become competitive rather
than complementary .... The present organization and
responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preclude
the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic
doctrine for the United States."^ 4 This observation on
organizational obstacles and other problems within the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, combined with similar observations
by the Gaither Committee, and growing legislative
dissatisfaction over "service rivalries," would result in
the Administration presenting a Department of Defense
reorganization plan to the Congress later in the year.
In addition to exploring the criticisms set forth
in the Rockefeller Report, the Committee, led by
Representative Sikes, also dramatized the growing erosion





air lift capabilities, and, in general, the over-all
paucity of the United States' limited war capability.
Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Department of Defense Appropriations in July, 1958, also
reflected serious concern over policy aspects of
America's strategic military programs. The ultimate
recommendations of this Committee provided for increase
in excess of one billion dollars for each of the military
services over what had been appropriated in 1957. Out of
this, Army equipment was to be modernized, strategic air
power and troop airlift were to be increased, the Polaris
submarine program was to be accelerated, new amphibious
ships were to be constructed, the Minuteman and Hound Dog
missile programs were to be accelerated, the Marine Corps
was once again to be stabilized at 200,000 men, and the
Army was to be increased from 870,000 to 900,000 men. 55
The President's ultimate refusal to spend most of the
funds appropriated in the Fiscal Year 1959 defense bill
effectively blunted this Congressional initiative and
provided grounds for heated controversy at a later time.
55u.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Report, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill
for 1959 , Senate Report No. 1937, 85th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1958, pp. 5-23.
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The Congress did, however, enact legislation which
forbade the President's committing any funds for Army
National Guard personnel unless that force were kept at
a level of 400,000 men. Only in this peculiar area of
Army reserve policy did the Congress specifically compel
the Administration to spend additional funds to maintain
the National Guard and Army reserves at Congressionally
determined levels. It is generally interpreted that this
was done in response to severe pressure from the civilian
reserve constituency, and not as a Congressional initiative
to affect strategic military policy, as were the other
military appropriation increases ultimately impounded by
the President.
By the end of 1958 the national security policy
problems of the Administration had increased significantly.
In the period of one year the nation was confronted with
Quemoy-Matsu in the Far East, Lebanon in the Middle East,
and portents of serious difficulties in Berlin. Each of
these incidents exposed serious limitations, in terms of
military capability, on the part of the United States.
Quemoy-Matsu revealed just how thinly the Navy was
56Kolodziej, op. cit., p. 484.
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stretched in attempting to cover its global commitments.
Lebanon, though hailed as a masterpiece of limited war
strategy, in fact revealed long-suspected weaknesses in
air lift and sea lift capacity. The threat of Berlin
again raised serious questions as to the capability of
America's conventional forces in Europe to militarily
resolve that situation should it come to pass.
The defense policy problems of the Administration
were further compounded by impressive Democratic gains in
the 1958 Congressional elections—forty-eight seats in
the House and fifteen in the Senate--^ and by the
"defection" of another highly respected military officer,
Lieutenant General James Gavin. The General, on retiring
as Director of the Army's Research and Development Command,
had published a book entitled, War and Peace in the Space
Age , which was highly critical of the Administration with
respect to guided missile programs, particularly the
CO
adverse effects of arbitrary budget restrictions.
However, in spite of increasing international
57Ibid
. , pp. 298-299.
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crisis and domestic criticism in 1958, the position of
the Administration, with respect to defense spending, did
not substantially change from the position that had been
held at the beginning of the year. Some program adjust-
ments had been made to increase the future effectiveness
of the strategic deterrent forces, but nothing approach-
ing the action demanded by Democratic Congressional
critics had been accomplished.
The less than dynamic Executive response does not,
however, take away from the fact that Congressional action
on the Fiscal Year 1959 defense bill showed Congress in its
best light to date. The Appropriations Subcommittees
made a sincere and relatively successful review of the
Administration's military program, and their foresighted-
ness in recognizing deficiencies in the program, and
efforts to legislate corrective action, even though to no
avail, reflected increased Congressional interest in and
comprehension of such matters. More significantly, it
reflected an increased Congressional willingness to
intervene in defense matters, even to the extent of
initiating changes.
The Administration, however, chose to ignore the
increasingly aggressive Congressional majority, and the
Fiscal Year 1960 budget presented by the Executive closely
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resembled the budget of the year before. Defense requests
for new obligational authority were set at $4.85 billion,
approximately $288 million less than the estimated
appropriations for Fiscal Year 1959, and most of the extra
funds appropriated by Congress in Fiscal Year 1959 were
assigned to Fiscal Year 1960 programs. Not only had the
Administration held the services to about the budgetary
ceilings of the preceding year, but it also tied them
again to the same percentage of funding authority that
had prevailed since Fiscal Year 1959.^9
The first six months of 1959 witnessed three
major Congressional hearings concerning the strategic
programs and military capabilities of the United States.
Two of these hearings were before the Senate Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, and the other was before the House Subcommittee on
Department of Defense Appropriations. In all these hear-
ings the Democratic majority missed no opportunity to
exact the public "pound of flesh" from the Administration
for the inflexible fiscal position that it had taken with
respect to America's strategic military requirements. The
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the January, 1959, Senate Preparedness Subcommittee and
the Aeronautical and Space Science Committee hearings on
missile and space activities, was indicative of the
attitude and approach the Congress was assuming in these
matters. He said, "A year ago this committee completed
a series of hearings into the American satellite and missile
programs. The conclusions, reached unanimously by this
group, were not reassuring .... We not only reached
conclusions, we also set forth recommendations--17 of them.
We are here today to review the progress that has been
made since those recommendations were made . " °^ The
Administration was to give an accounting, and the
Democratic majority was obviously going to make it as
revealingly unpleasant as possible.
With the exception of the House Appropriation
proceedings, these hearings were not intended to produce
legislation. They were, in part, a continuation of the
partisan Democratic effort, which had commenced in 1954,
to turn the defense issue to their advantage in the fight
°0u.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Joint
Hearings, Missiles and Space Activities , 8 6th Congress,
1st Session, 1959, pp. 1-2.
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for additional Congressional seats, and ultimately for
the Presidency, as well as an effort to increase pressure
on the Executive to effect changes in strategic military
programs.
The hearings were generally similar in their
pursuit of these objectives in that all of them (a) took
the Administration to task for the unsatisfactory status
of America's military posture; (b) made stringent efforts
to show that the Administration was not taking steps to
improve that posture; (c) delineated corrective action
with respect to specific programs; and (d) denounced
repeatedly the primacy of budgetary considerations over
military requirements.
The missile and space hearings in the Senate in
January, 1959, while encompassing all the above areas
of criticism, placed emphasis on budgetary considerations
This was due in part to the surprising opening statement
of Defense Secretary McElroy to the effect that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff "have said to me in writing that they
consider that the fiscal year 1960 proposed expenditure
figure is adequate to provide for the essential programs
necessary for the defense of the Nation for the period
under consideration. "^l While initially taken aback by
61 Ibid., p. 6.
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this apparent "change of heart" on the part of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Committee members soon discovered
that the senior military officers had also submitted
written reservations as to the adequacy of the budget.
These reservations were substantial, ranging from man-
power shortages in the Army and Marine Corps to insufficient
funding for modernization and procurement of Naval ships
and aircraft. °^ Further testimony revealed that each of
the service chiefs, as in years past, felt that the fund-
ing was grossly inadequate, and the Committee was quick
to capitalize on what appeared to be "heavy-handed"
coercion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Administra-
tion.
Subsequent to rebuffing the Administration's
effort to present a united front with respect to budget
adequacy, the Committees proceeded to a consideration of
specific strategic military programs. The hearing
revealed or re-emphasized that: (a) the United States
did not have a warning system against incoming ballistic
missiles; (b) the Strategic Air Command was not on





apparently voluntarily surrendering ICBM superiority
to the Soviet Union; and (d) manpower cuts in the Army
and Marine Corps had significantly reduced the capability
of the United States to fight limited wars. "3
America's limited war capability was also closely
scrutinized during the January, 1959, House Subcommittee
hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1960. This increasingly policy-oriented
Subcommittee was again particularly concerned with the
effect on America's military posture resulting from
continued reductions in Army troop levels, and lack of
progress in the modernization of Army equipment. The
critical nature of such reductions was clearly brought
out in the testimony of Defense Secretary McElroy, who
acknowledged that the Army had not been reduced to
870,000 men as planned in 1958, because of the Lebanon
crisis. Representative Mahon was quick to point out
that "If we are on such a razor edge as to mean that you
hesitate [to reduce forces] on account of Lebanon, where
not a shot was fired, it would seem that you probably have
cut your manpower levels a little too short in the
63Ibid.
, pp. 4 0-7 5.
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Army." The point was well made, and it had been
precipitated by the Administration's key witness.
The Appropriations Subcommittee then turned to
a consideration of air lift and sea lift capability.
Administration witnesses indicated that the Navy had
just completed a study which revealed that its sea lift
capability was satisfactory. In the face of testimony
to the contrary over the past two years, the Committee
was plainly sceptical. Representative Flood inquired,
"Did that sealift include the 10- and 12-knot crates that
they had listed here last year with the Navy?" When the
answer was in the affirmative, Flood responded with
"Wow!" The Administration's claim that the present
air lift capacity was also adequate resulted in similar
expressions of doubt. When General Twining, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that United States
air lift capacity was adequate to respond to any number
of limited war situations, Representative Flood asked,
°^U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of
Defense Appropriations for I960 , 86th Congress, 1st






"With what? Pigeons?" & The exchanges, while humorous
on occasion, did not fail to effectively communicate the
seriousness of such deficiencies.
The Congressional effort to emphasize these
deficiencies and to "expose" the Executive continued in
the special hearings before the Senate Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee in March and May, 195 9. The
hearings, entitled Major Defense Matters , occurred in
two separate parts. The first, which took place in March,
primarily addressed itself to specific strategic program
deficiencies, while the seconc part, in May, dealt almost
exclusively with budgetary considerations.
This two-part hearing also constituted the
principal battleground between the Democratic Congres-
sional majority and the Executive with respect to the
dispute over unspent defense appropriations. The
President's refusal to spend most of the extra funds
appropriated by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1959 defense bill
particularly rankled Congressional sensibilities, which
are always alert and offended by any effort to infringe







this instance, were convinced that there had been a
gross intrusion by the Executive. The Administration
had released funds for only one of the four Polaris
submarines which Congress had approved in 1958. The
other three were to be included in the President's
Fiscal Year 1960 program, and no further procurement funds
were assigned to the program. ^7 Army Chief of Staff
General Maxwell Taylor, in response to queries from
Senator Lyndon Johnson, also revealed that 210 million
dollars appropriated for Army procurement had been with-
held, and that an additional 37 million dollars for
Army modernization, and over 6 million dollars for Army
construction, had also not been authorized for expendi-
ture. 68
Constitutional prerogatives notwithstanding, it
did appear, in the face of the recent Lebanon crisis and
the potential crisis at Berlin, that the magnitude of
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The case made by the Administration in defense of such
measures was not altogether convincing, and the Committee
made the most of this lack of credibility throughout the
hearing.
The March hearing provided the forum for a
comprehensive voicing of Congressional dissatisfaction
with the Nation's strategic military programs with
particular emphasis on the inadequacy and vulnerability
of SAC's ICBM force, deficiencies in the conventional
Army forces, and the deteriorating condition of the Navy.
Senator Henry M. Jackson, a long-time proponent of
America's ballistic missile program, convincingly argued
that the relatively invulnerable Minuteman ICBM was
6 Qproceeding much too slowly. General Maxwell Taylor
for the first time publicly acknowledged that the U.S.
Army in Europe, if it abstained from using nuclear
weapons, could not defend itself with existing conventional
forces against a full Soviet attack;' and Senator
Johnson, while lauding the Navy's "blue and gold" attitude,









going to be a Navy cannot be assumed unless some of these
people stand up and fight for it . . . but if you have
gotten only 15, 16, or 18 per cent of your ships modern
since World War II, it seems to me that you had better be
doing some modernization pretty quickly. If you do not
. . . members of the committee believe pretty strongly
that you are just not going to have a modern service at
all." 71
There were few, if any, areas of America's
military posture that the Subcommittee had failed to touch
on, and while much of this had been concerned with force
levels and hardware, there nevertheless had also been some
relatively penetrating observations made with respect to
policy considerations underpinning the Administration's
specific program decisions. In this regard, the issue of
budgetary primacy over military requirements had been
raised at increasingly frequent intervals. It therefore
was anticipated that the Subcommittee would turn its
attention, as it did in March, 1959, to a consideration of
the Administration's budgetary process.




majority was obviously to publicly substantiate, if
possible, the view that the Executive had in the past
and did now place budgetary considerations above
strategic military requirements. The Administration's
objective was to effectively rebut these allegations, and
the key witness upon which the hopes of both parties rested
was Mr. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
The fundamental considerations or questions to
be resolved were: (a) Did the Bureau of the Budget
establish arbitrary ceilings or limitations on the armed
services regardless of stated requirements, as claimed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (b) did the Bureau of the
Budget recommend or direct that certain additional defense
funds appropriated by the Congress not be expended. Mr.
Stans' initial portrayal of the Bureau's role in these
matters could hardly be construed as villainous. He
said, "The Bureau of the Budget does not make war plans.
It does not in any way plan or propose war strategy or
anything of that type. These are matters determined by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council,
and the President. We do not set a dollar limitation on





At another point he said, "I think there are many people
who believe that we specifically and directly fix the level
of expenditures for the Department of Defense, or that we
specifically rule out programs or requests for money. We
do not. "'^ In response to questions concerning unspent
defense appropriations, Stans emphatically stated that
these funds had not been withheld on the recommendation of
the Budget Bureau. In general, Mr. Stans presented a
picture which sharply contrasted with that painted by the
individual service chiefs, and it was apparent that the
Committee members were initially taken aback by this aura
of warm benevolence. However, under close questioning,
particularly by Senator Johnson, a significantly different
picture began to emerge. When heavily pressed, Stans 1
answers began to reveal a facet of the Budget Bureau's role
in these matters that could hardly be construed as benevolent
Stans grudgingly acknowledged that ceilings or limits were
imposed on the Department of Defense when he said, "The only
limitation that was placed upon him [the Secretary of De-
fense] was that in the aggregate the Secretary would not
ask for a greater budget for the Department of Defense than
appeared in the budget document last January."' 4
73 Ibid
. , p. 238.
74 Ibid., p. 304.
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If there still remained any doubts in this regard, they
were summarily resolved when Stans angrily stated, "I
think we all understand that demands for military programs
can be almost unlimited. The budget is one device that
we have for forcing the making of choices in the Depart-
7 S
ment of Defense." The most fundamental question had
been answered. There were budgetary limitations imposed,
and, with the Secretary of Defense being directed to
remain within a previous year's budget, such limitations
did appear to be unrelated to changing military require-
ments.
While Stans had unwillingly admitted to Executive
limitations or ceilings, he would not, however, acknowledge
that the Bureau of the Budget established these limita-
tions. He consistently held to the end that his function
was strictly recommendatory in nature, and that ultimate
decisions in these matters were made by the President.
Whether the Budget Bureau established the limitations or
whether the President had done so was not really germane.
The Administration stood exposed of placing budgetary





this judgment was based on a more or less superficial
exploration of the budgetary process, it v/as nevertheless
substantially true. The hearing had admirably served the
purpose for which it was intended. A comprehensive
listing of well-substantiated deficiencies in America's
strategic military programs had been developed, and the
Administration's "primacy of budget" approach to military
program decision-making had been reasonably well borne
out. By mid-summer of 1959, it therefore appeared that
momentum developed by the growing consensus within the
Congress, favoring increased defense spending and a more
balanced military posture, had developed to the point
where substantial legislative intervention and/or
initiative in these matters was imperative.
The Bomarc-Nike Hercules air defense missile
dispute, which reached its climax at about this time,
seemed to substantiate such a view. These two systems
had been originally conceived as complementary air
defense weapons; however, as the range differences between
them narrowed, the two began to compete with each other.
By mid-1959, the Congress faced the prospect of having to
appropriate another billion dollars for Fiscal Year 196 0,
without much assurance that the Defense Department would
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decide between the two systems. The Senate Armed Services
Committee and the House Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee urged the Secretary of Defense to make a
decision, and even authorized him to allocate funds
between the two systems as he saw fit. Still no decision
was made. Congressional patience in this matter was
exhausted, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee, with
surprising bi-partisan co-operation, cut $162.7 million
from the Bomarc program. While the House group was
slashing Bomarc, the Senate Armed Services Committee was
vetoing the Nike-Hercules program. ^° Both Committees
called upon the Defense Secretary to develop a master
plan for air defense. Forced by the Congress to make a
decision in this regard, the Department of Defense
produced a plan to save the air defense program before it
was completely destroyed by the Congress. The plan
reduced emphasis on defense against bombers, and the Nike-
Zens anti-missile system was upgraded as a response to
the Soviet shift to long-range missiles. In keeping with
these decisions, Congress provided $137 million more for
the Nike-Zeus program than the administration had wanted,
76 Kolodziej , op. cit
. , p. 305.
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and Bomarc was cut by $82 million. ' Congressional
initiative had, therefore, prompted the Defense Department
to formulate a more effective plan, thereby preventing
hundreds of millions of dollars in unnecessary duplication,
and assisted the development of a more reliable air
defense network.
The aggressive Congressional attitude and initi-
ative with respect to strategic military matters, so
prevalent in the preparedness hearings and air defense
system dispute, were not reflected in the final defense
appropriations bill approved by the Congress. The final
bill totaled $39.2 billion, which was actually $19.9
million less than had been reuqested in the President's
original defense proposal. '°
Even though Congress had forced a decision on air
defense, spurred progress in missile work, and wrought
numerous changes in the defense measure itself, the fact
remained that the President's original budgetary ceiling
was essentially intact. The Congressional majority,
though apparently convinced that such ceilings were
77Ibid





inhibiting the development of a more balanced and
effective military establishment, was still not willing,
at this point, to take the major step of breaking the
Executive's budgetary bond principally fettering defense
policy. Increasing public and legislative consternation
over strategic military policy, and the prospect of a
forthcoming President election, made it questionable,
however, whether the Administration in 1960 could
continue to presume upon the traditional unwillingness
of Congress to act decisively in these matters.

CHAPTER III
MANDATE FOR CHANGE 19 6
Throughout the mid- and late 1950 ' s it was clear
that, without Presidential assent and co-operation, the
Democratic majority within the Congress could not or
would not force its strategic views and corresponding
program requirements upon the Administration. Only once
had restrictive requirements, compelling Executive
revision of defense programs, been written into law, and
this was in the very political area of Army Reserves and
National Guard. Yet, in early 1960, with a Presidential
election in the offing, it appeared that a sufficiently
aggressive and cohesive Congressional majority had now
been formed which was prepared and committed to under-
writing significant changes in the Administration's
strategic military programs, regardless of Executive
desires.
Hearings before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee considering the Fiscal Year 1961 defense bill
seemed to substantiate this view. The hearing picked up
almost where it had left off from the previous year,
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except that hostile Democratic Committee members were
far more aggressive in pressing their attack on the
Administration's fiscal approach to strategic military
programs. Two areas which received greatest emphasis
in the course of these proceedings were troop airlift
capability, and Army force levels and equipment moderni-
zation. Representative Flood angrily summed up the
Committee consensus view on airlift when he said, "I
consider the airlift problem, and I have been belaboring
the point from this chair for many years, deadly serious
for lack of it. I do not think the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and I do not think the Department of Defense and all of
the secretaries and admirals and generals who have been
coming up here, have been fair with us, have been telling
us all the truth, and I have been resenting it almost to
the point of wanting to charge them with conspiracy to
keep from us the true facts on airlift .... The
Secretary of Defense has been woefully derelict in not
meeting this problem. The Air Force people have been
pushing it under the rug for good or bad reasons, but
that is the fact. It is the Achilles heel of this whole
show. Thank God I hope and pray we are going to meet this
problem, really meet it this time, instead of having these
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10, 20, 30 road shows that have been performed here as
special hearings on airlift."' 9 Flood's observation,
while highly emotional, was an accurate description, and
no effective rebuttal was made by the Administration in
the course of the hearing.
The consideration of Army force levels and
modernization produced equally ineffective Administration
rebuttals to Committee criticism, particularly after Army
Secretary Brucker acknowledged that the Army's present
force of approximately 870,000 men was "a minimum and
marginal force and any less would not enable us to carry
out the commitments we have . " ° ^
The entire hearing was a tension-filled, highly
emotional proceeding which reflected both the increased
political pressure of an election year and the heightened
level of Congressional frustration that prevailed as a
result of the continued lack of responsiveness on the
part of the Executive in these matters.
The findings and emphasis of this hearing were
79u.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of Committee
on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1961 , 86th Congress, 2nd Session, i960,





admirably complemented by the January, I960, publication
of General Maxwell Taylor's book entitled The Uncertain
Trumpet . General Taylor, prior to his retirement as
Army Chief of Staff in June, 1959, had been one of the
most eloquent and persistent "in-House" critics of the
Administration's strategic military policies, and in
The Uncertain Trumpet he set forth what he considered to
be the most significant obstacles to the development of
such policies and detailed the existing major deficiencies
in America's military posture. He further outlined a
course of action for immediate correction of the most
serious deficiencies, and a long-range program for the
ultimate improvement of strategic military policy and
supporting programs
.
In delineating major administrative obstacles
to the development of defense policy, he said, ". . . in
spite of the seeming logical procedures for developing
national strategy in the National Security Council and
military strategy in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
system has failed for several fundamental reasons. The
National Security Council has not come to grips with the
fundamental defense problems and has failed to produce
clear-cut guidance for the armed forces. The Joint
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Chiefs of Staff have failed to agree on the forces
needed to support the agreed strategic concept, and hence
have not produced the military guidance needed by the
military services. The Secretary of Defense has inter-
jected fiscal considerations into mid-range planning and
has thus deprived it of much of its potential value."
In his consideration of the Administration's
budgetary policy and/or process, General Taylor
emphasized two particular areas of concern. The first,
and one that had been considered at length by the Congress,
was the establishment of budgetary limitations on the
armed services without reference to military requirements.
In this regard he said, "... the Secretary of Defense,
through the use of budgetary guidelines, has become the
true artisan of our military strategy without necessarily
foreseeing the end product. This setting of guidelines
has not been an arbitrary action on his part, but one to
which he has been impelled in carrying out the policies
of the Executive branch of the government, especially
the directives of the Bureau of the Budget. "82 The other






area of budgetary concern, and one that Congress had not
considered exhaustively, was vertical budgeting by
individual military service as opposed to horizontal
budgeting by strategic or tactical function. This
particular aspect of budgeting would, however, come under
close Congressional scrutiny later in the year.
General Taylor's observations on the inadequacies
of America's military posture included in part: the
missile gap, vulnerability of SAC, and limited war
capabilities. His recommendations for immediate cor-
rective action or "quick fixes" to offset these critical
disabilities were: (1) improve planning and training
for limited war; (2) exploit the mobile intermediate
range ballistic missile; (3) provide better protection
for SAC; (4) implement a limited fall-out shelter
o o
program. OJ
The long-range program for ultimate strategic
military policy improvement, set forth by General Taylor,
required that the United States first renounce reliance
upon the strategy of massive retaliation and then prepare






appropriate to the situation. To this end he proposed
that first priority be given, "to modernize and protect
the atomic deterrent force and to build up our limited-
war counterattrition forces [and thereafter] make care-
fully selected provisions for continental air defense
..8 4
• • • •
This long-range military program, which drew
heavily on earlier views of General Ridgway, was sub-
stantially the detailed basis of the Kennedy Administra-
tion's strategy of "Flexible Response" or "Multiple
Options." A number of Taylor's "quick fixes" would also
be implemented immediately upon the Kennedy Adminis-
tration coming to power. It is interesting to note that,
with the possible exception of his remarks concerning
the role of the National Security Council, the majority
of General Taylor's observations on defense budgeting,
deficiencies in strategic and tactical military capa-
bilities, and required corrective action, generally
coincided with views that had been expressed by the
Congress over the past several years. Uncertain Trumpet
had pulled these views together into an integrated and






The message of Uncertain Trumpet and the time-
liness of its publication had considerable impact on the
public and the Congress, noticeably more than did
General Matthew Ridgway's Soldier in 1956. For the
Administration it constituted a serious setback to the
stringent election year effort being made to dampen
agitation over defense matters. For the Democratic
opposition it was a windfall in the effort to publicly
discredit the Executive, while at the same time providing
a comprehensive strategic "position" behind which to rally
The views expressed in Uncertain Trumpet were
brought heavily to play during joint hearings before the
Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Aeronautical and
Space Science Committee in February and March of 1960.
These hearings, entitled Missiles, Space, and Other Major
Defense Matters
, would also be the last opportunity for
Senator Lyndon Johnson's powerful and hostile Subcommittee
to take the Administration to task before the November
elections
.
General Taylor was immediately called before the
Committees, and, in the course of his testimony, he
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reiterated, for the record, every major point made in
Uncertain Trumpet .
In addition to giving full vent to General
Taylor's views, the hearings also emphasized three other
significant strategic military problem areas. These were:
(1) the ICBM program was not being accelerated rapidly
enough; (2) the Strategic Air Command was not maintaining
a continuous airborne alert; (3) the funds for the Polaris
program and for modernization of the Navy were totally
inadequate.
Testimony concerning the Nation's ICBM program
revealed that, while substantial progress had been made
in this area, what with the United States' now having an
operational ICBM, nevertheless the program was not moving
as rapidly as it should. In this regard, Lieutenant-
General B. Schriever, Commander of the Air Force Research
and Development Command, said, "I would say that they
[ICBM programs] were not stepped up to the degree that I
felt [they] should have been. "85 >phe Administration's
o c
U.S. Congress, Seante, Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, Joint
Hearings ,, li .:,les
,
Space, and Other Major Defense Matters
,
86th Congress, 2nd Session, I96 0, p. 19 9.
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position that adequate progress was now made in this
field was further weakened by a contradiction in testimony
between Defense Secretary Gates and CIA Director Allen
Dulles. Secretary Gates, in his testimony, indicated
that the "missile gap" had been narrowed, while Mr. Dulles,
in his, indicated that the reverse was true. ° Secretary
Gates, who had just recently been appointed to his
position, was unable to resolve this difference of
"expert opinion," and so it remained throughout the
remainder of the hearing.
The case for a continuous SAC airborne alert was
also well made in the course of the hearings. General
Thomas Power, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, in
support of this requirement, said, "I think, due to the
warning situation and due to the fact that the Russians
are introducing missiles into their inventory, that we
should maintain the highest possible percentage of our
heavy force on continuous airborne alert." °' General
Power further went on to say that the 1961 budget did
not provide adequate funding for such an alert. The
86 Ibid





unwillingness of the Administration to provide for what
appeared to be an essential strategic requirement,
particularly in view of the suspected missile gap, was
exploited at every opportunity by the Democratic
Committee members.
It was the Navy, however, that delivered the most
telling "broadside" against the Administration during the
preparedness proceedings. Admiral A. Burke, Chief of
Naval Operations, testified that the funds to be
provided for the Polaris program in 1961 were grossly
inadequate, and that additional funds appropriated by
the Congress in the previous year had not been authorized
for expenditure by the Executive. These allegations were
serious, but they had been made before. What was new
and stunning was the report of the Navy Board on Fleet
Modernization, which counsel for the Subcommittee had
inserted en bloc into the record. The report said, in
part, "Our observation and an evaluation of the information
before us led to one inescapable conclusion. The U.S.
Fleet is not in an acceptable state of readiness . . . the
group believes that the primary cause of this situation
is an ever-widening gap between the responsibilities
assigned to the Navy and the financial resources allocated
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to it for carrying out those responsibilities . "88
The Administration's strategic military policies
and programs had not fared well in these hearings, and
the Congressional dissatisfaction generated here would
carry over and significantly affect the ultimate defense
appropriation legislation passed later in the year.
Congressional consideration of matters affecting
strategic military policy also took place in February,
1960, in hearings entitled, Organizing for National
Security
,
before the Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations.
While hearings concerning "organization" would not by
definition provide a forum for consideration of strategic
military policy and related programs, nevertheless parts
of these proceedings became such a forum. That this
occurred could be attributed in no small part to the fact
that Senator Henry M. Jackson, long-time opponent of the
Administration's military policies, was Chairman of the
Subcommittee
.
Testimony which bore most directly on strategic





of retired General Maxwell Taylor. Encouraged by Senator
Jackson, General Taylor launched into his now well-known
views on the many factors underlying existing deficiencies
in America's military posture. In this instance, however,
those factors relating to the budgetary process were
brought into clearer focus than ever had been the case
before. Budgetary limitations established without
reference to military requirements; military requirements
generated without reference to the budgetary process; and
problems resulting from vertical budgeting by service as
opposed to horizontal budgeting by function, were all
O Q
considered at length, and in aggregate generally
acknowledged to have been the most significant hindrances
to the development of realistic strategic military policies
and supporting programs
.
These hearings continued well into the following
year, and therefore produced no climactic "summing up" of
issues that characterized many other hearings considering
similar matters during the election year.
In matters of defense appropriation legislation,
o q U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations,




however, it was readily apparent that the Eighty-sixth
Congress was committed to far more than "summing up"
issues. The long building consensus within the Congress
now appeared prepared to effect relatively significant
changes in strategic military programs, despite Executive
opposition.
The Senate Appropriations Committee initially
enlarged the President's defense recommendations by over
$1 billion, and amendments by Senators Paul Douglas and
Henry M. Jackson, which were accepted during the course
of debate, providing for a 200,000 man Marine Corps and
more funds for Army modernization, added another $140
million to the Senate bill. In conference, the two
houses agreed to a final defense appropriation of just
under $40 billion, $661.6 million over the Administra-
tion's early budget estimates, and $73 0.7 million over
the President's revised request of April, I960. ° The
specific programs designated by Congress to receive the
most substantial portion of the additional funding were:
troop airlift, Minuteman and Atlas ICBM's, anti-submarine
Warfare, Army equipment modernization, and Polaris.
9 Kolodziej, op. cit





Yet, in spite of its sizeable increases in
military appropriations, and its multiple manipulations
of the defense budget, the Congress, even in 19 60, never
fully succeeded in departing significantly from the "New
Look." In its essential conceptual features, the "New
Look" remained intact until the advent of the Kennedy
Administration. At the same time, it is abundantly clear
that the changes wrought by the Kennedy Administration,
in the implementation of Flexible Response, grew essen-
tially, almost exclusively, out of the Congressional ferment
of the latter 1950* s. The point here is that the Congress
did not influence military policy or prepare the way for
Flexible Response only by appropriating more money than
the President requested. Congressional influence was
also exercised through the efforts of an increasing number
of legislators striving to understand and willing to deal
with the economic and fiscal policies underlying the
Nation's military programs. This coming to grips with
"fiscal policy" enabled the Congress to successfully
press the Eisenhower Administration for more closely
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